






PLANNING AS URBAN MANAGEMENT: 
A Critical Assessment 
Max Neutze 
and 
THE INSTRUMENTS OF PLANNING: 
Urban Management 
John Mant 
URU Working Paper No. 6 
August 1988 
USTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
EARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
METROPOLITAN PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA 
Urba.n Manangement 
,.,. .· 
PLANNING AS URBAN MANAGEMENT: 
A Critical Assessment 
Max Neutze 
and 
THE INSTRUMENTS OF PLANNING: 
( S A J 
A 
6 HT ID/ 
. u 87 
ISBN 0 7315 0397 X 
ISSN 1030 2921 
Urban Management 
John Mant 
URU Working Paper No. 6 
August 1988 
SERIES EDITORS: 
S.R. Schreiner and CJ. Lloyd 
~ Urban Research Unit 
Research School of Social Sciences 
Australian National University 
POBox4 
~berra, ACT, Australia 2601 
ABSTRACT 
A long-standing debaJe over the nature and merits of 'rational 
comprehensive' versus 'incrementalist' models of public decision-making 
is continued in the papers on their application to planning by Max Neutze 
andlohnMant. 
Neutze reviews the post-war optomistic rise of comprehensive 
planning, and its subsequent replacement by more modest 'urban 
management' strategies in the wake of its apparent failure to 'deliver the 
goods'. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a growing perception of 
the planning process as inherently political, of end-state planning as 
inflexible and bureaucratic, of collective action as less beneficial socially 
and economical}y than individual, and of the inability of planning to 
substantially affect the lot of the poor. This perception led to the 
development of minimalist and prophylactic planning strategies and a retreat 
from bold and visionary planning approaches which require sufficient 
determination to allow long-term decision-making. 
Master planning assumes the lead should be taken by a planning 
authority with a comprehensive view of all parts of the system. 
I ncrementalist approaches implicitly accept the leading role of the private 
sector despite possible detriments, especially in the area of service 
provision efficiency. The shift to urban management allows flexible 
responses to individual decisions, a characteristic particularly useful in the 
area of environmental and amenity protection, but it sacrifices the benefits 
of continuing commitments to a choosen alternative. The gains inflexibility 
which come with the kind of urban management which is less oriented to a 
long-term vision will necessarily be accompanied by losses in efficiency 
through less effective coordination between different investment decisions, 
and an inability to consider large scale alternatives in patterns of 
development. 
Mant argues that urban management is not an instrument of planning. 
Plan-making is an instrument of urban management. Plans are needed from 
time to time for particular purposes. It is a mistake to conceive of 
'planning' as a simple lineal progression from plan to implementation. 
Further, 'planning' and 'urban management' should not be conceived as 
competing approaches to urban public poliq. The making of plans should 
be seen as a public policy tool for the achievement of del{berate and, at 
times, quite limited objectives. 
This paper discusses the role and limitations of plan-making as an urban 
management tool. The traditional comprehensive end-state planning 
exercise suffers from the same deficiencies as a public policy tool as other 
rational comprehensive policy activities. 
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An alternative system for managing the urban process to the end-state 
plan is advocated in the paper. The development of the Staging Study in 
Adelaide in the late 1970s 1s briefly described. This work, on which were 
modelled metropolitan planning strategies in Sydney and, more recently, in 
Melbourne, can be seen as an example of strategic incrementalism. That the 
identification of new areas for urban development was unnecessary in 
Adelaide in the late 1970s does not mean that, sometimes, it is not 
appropriate to make new strategy plans. The recent strategy planning work 
in several Australian capital cities are examples of plan-making as part of 
the urban management process. 
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METROPOLITAN PLANNING IN AUSTRALIA 
A URU Sponsored Seminar 
Max Neutze's and John Mant's papers were contributions to a two-day 
seminar on Metropolitan Planning in Australia organised by the Urban 
Research Unit in February 1988. This is the third publication of papers 
from the seminar to appear in this series. The foci of the seminar were the 
metropolitan plans or strategies which have recently aP.peared for four of 
Australia's largest cities. On the first day, papers descnbin~ the evolution 
and present state of planning policies and machinery m Melbourne, 
Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth and Sydney were discussed. On the second, a 
variety of metropolitan planning themes were addressed. These included 
'Planning Objectives' and the 'Instruments of Planning', with an 
international perspective provided by Peter Self. A full list of the papers 
delivered at the seminar can be found in the endpapers of this publication. . 
In the view of the Urban Research Unit, the seminar was timely. Sydney 
has a new metropolitan strategy covering urban growth and change for a 
population of up to four and a half million. Adelaide is the subject of a new 
25-year metropolitan development strategy. Perth's corridor plan has been 
the subject of a recent major review. Melbourne has seen the transfer of 
metropolitan planning from the Melbourne Metropolitan Board of Works to 
the State Government, and the appearance of a 10-year urban strategy as 
part of a new integrated system of Cabinet policy-making. In the present 
unfavourable economic and political climate for strategic government 
planning, this revival of Australian metropolitan planning holds 
considerable interest. What can the big cities learn from each other's plans 
or from overseas experience? How useful are long-term land use plans and 
how do they relate to problems of urban management and ·service 
coordination'! How much 'planning' is possible as opposed to incremental 
change and ad hoc decisions? What time horizons should be used? How, 
and how far, will metropolitan plans be actually implemented? 
In the discussion, it emerged that all big cities (except Brisbane) wanted to 
reduce the extent and the cost of further peripheral growth, and to 
encourage urban consolidation and the promotion of stronger suburban 
centres. All of them wanted to retain the vitality of the capital city and its 
central area. The seminar revealed that these goals will not be easy to 
achieve, and that further study of the methods of unplementation would be 
well worthwhile. 
The second day produced intensive discussion of the respective virtues and 
vices of statutory land use plans versus coordinated but pragmatic urban 
management systems. The machinery of State Government ws given 
atention, as was the prospective role of local government, highlighted by 
the case of Brisbane. International ex.Perience suggested the key 
importance of land, housing and transportation policies for the achievement 
of metropolitan objectives, subjects which get too little attention in the 
Australian metropolitan plans. Some participants brought attention to the 
desirability of directing some growth to other centres m the same State. 
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Others noted the weak understanding by planners of the property market 
and the need for more long-term evaluation of development costs and 
benefits. 
The seminar achieved its aim of a useful review of the present state of 
metropolitan planning in Australia. In its wake, lies a formidable agenda 
for further research, comparison, evaluation and effective government 
action. 
vi 
PLANNING AS URBAN MANAGEMENT: 
A Critical Assessment 
Max Neutz.e 
Urban Research Unit 
I intend to take a partly historical and partly analytical approach to assessing 
the contribution of urban management to urban planning. The historical 
approach is valuable because it helps to assess the reasons for the growth in 
urban management's popularity. An analytical approach is essential to 
demonstrate the limits to the ability of urban management to achieve the 
recognised objectives of planning. The first part of the paper, then, asks 
why traditional urban planning became somewhat discredited and why 
urban management came to be seen as a more promising approach. The 
second part concentrates on the limitations of urban management as it is 
commonly practiced. 
In preparing this paper I have been influenced particularly by the experience 
of the only two Australian cities I have observed closely in recent years: 
Perth and Canberra. I observed the former over a period of two years 
during which I chaired a panel which guided the work of a team in 
reviewing the Corridor and Metropolitan Regional Scheme (W ASPC 1987). 
The corridor plan which was adopted in 1971 was a variation on the 1955 
Stephenson-Hepburn Plan. Thus about every 16 years there has been a 
major review of the objectives and directions for the growth of Perth. The 
Corridor Plan was heavily based on a planning philosophy of the time in 
which residential growth was to be confined to corridors each of which 
would be served by a good transport spine and a series of centres. Only 
some aspects of the corridor plan worked wen and, as a result, it was 
necessary to reconsider which should be maintained and which varied. 
There had also been other changes such as an increasing reliance on 
groundwater and a greatly decreased employment in manufacturing relative 
to services. The review panel agreed with the West Australian Government 
that it was time to carry out a comprehensive review. There had been 
reviews of parts of the plan since 1971. Ill-deed, each corridor and each 
subregional centre had been subject to a detailed planning study, but always 
within the general framework of the Corridor Plan. The review 
recommended that there should be significant variations but by no means a 
wholesale scrapping of the corridor form of development. 
My familiarity with Canberra results from the fact that I live there and have 
been involved in two reviews of a different kind. The first was of the role 
and functions of the National Capital Development Commission, which was 
then Canberra's planning authority, by the White Committee (Committee of 
Review ... 1983), and the second a study of the leasehold system which 
provides the instrument for public control over the use of land in Canberra 
(Neutze 1987). The so-called 'Y' plan for metropolitan development of 
Canberra was produced in the late 1960s and, despite some criticism was 
the guiding plan for the city's development until a few years ago. The 
White Committee recommended that it should be reviewed and the review, 
carried out by the Commission, reaffirmed that it was an appropriate 
metropolitan plan. Despite this, the Commission, without apparently 
examining its metropolitan implications, promoted a greatly increased 
density of development of the commercial centre, to an extent that was 
inconsistent with the relatively self-contained urban districts that are integral 
features of the 'Y' plan. The results of such actions, which do not appear to 
have been based on a thorough and long-term re-examination of all aspects 
of metropolitan development, have been subject to much criticism. 
The Rise of Urban Management 
In the flush of optimism which occurred around the end of the second world 
war, when political leaders and people in the western world were 
determined to put behind them the miseries of a long and deep depression 
and a devastating war, there was much support for visionary plans for 
towns and cities which would bring the good life to their inhabitants. These 
visions included many elements - the demolition of slums, the building of 
garden suburbs, the separation of dirty and noisy factories from residential 
areas and the provision of adequate housing and open space in all parts of 
cities. In Australia there were plans for public housing to be provided for 
those who could not afford to buy or rent adequate housing in the market. 
Thus the main cause of poor living conditions, that poor people could not 
afford better, would be eliminated. 
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While those visions proved to be flawed for two reasons it is important to 
recognise, as Hugh Stretton (1970) so eloquently reminded us, the extent to 
which the suburban development that mushroomed after the war provided 
good living conditions for its residents. The first flaw was that many of the 
visions were not translated into reality. Planners could draw lines on maps 
and colour the areas between them in different colours but, as Leonie 
Sandercock (1975) argued, in a capitalist society where property is privately 
owned the owners of property make the main decisions about the way a city 
develops, ensuring that it serves the demands of those with spending 
power. Public housing could not shoulder the whole burden of providing a 
good living environment for the poor. Further, not enough resources were 
put into it and many poor families continued to live in privately rented 
housing. 
Perhaps more importantly, even the planners' successes proved to be 
disappointing. Freeways were the planning answer to the congested narrow 
roads that choked pre-war cities , but it proved impossible to meet the 
demand for road space as a motor car (or two or three of them) became part 
of the equipment of nearly every household. What is more, building the 
freeways , especially through established areas, caused so much physical 
and social disruption, noise and pollution that the cure often seemed worse 
than the complaint. While low density residential suburbs provided 
spacious living, they also condemned many housewives to isolation and 
loneliness and many workers to long journeys to work. Demolition of high 
density and poor quality housing and its replacement by high rise flats at 
great expense often brought worse social, even if better physical, living 
conditions (Stevenson et al 1967; Jones 1972). The separation of industrial 
and commercial development from residential areas was one of the planning 
successes but also one of the reasons for the huge volume of traffic. Low 
density suburbs could not support good public transport, which forced even 
more people to use cars. To make matters worse, planners were successful 
in decanting a good deal of manufacturing, retailing and services from the 
central areas to many suburban industrial estates and commercial centres. 
They were indeed closer to where people ~ived , but could not provide the 
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high volume demand for travel along particular routes that allows buses and 
trains to operate efficiently. 
In summary, the critics claimed the plans were often ineffective and, even 
when they were effective, they did not produce the promised benefits. This 
interpretation of post-war experience with planning is not advanced as a 
balanced one, or one to which I would subscribe. It was, however, a 
common and influential assessment of its achievements and shortcomings. 
In order to show why ambitious attempts at 'comprehensive urban 
planning' were replaced by more modest 'urban management' it is 
necessary to analyse in closer detail some of the diagnoses of the influential 
shortcomings of planning. 
First, planning was seen as predominantly a technical activity whose 
intellectual and professional peers were engineering and architecture. 
Planners expected to advise governments of the best 'planning solution' to a 
problem and it was then up to governments to adopt the solutions and 
provide the political support to ensure that the measures necessary to 
implement the solution were taken. The more influential planners regarded 
it as part of their task to 'sell' their visions of the future and their solutions 
to problems. They aimed to influence the public at large, (necessary to 
stiffen the resolve of their political masters), but their more particular targets 
were influential people in both the private and the public sector. It was 
especially important to keep the public authorities and departments 
responsible for roads and other transport services, and for water and 
sewerage, aware of the benefits for their operations that could result from 
comprehensive planning. 
The idea gradually emerged that urban planners had a particular coordinating 
role within government, especially at the state and local level. Urban plans 
could provide the spatial framework for future changes in the city within 
which other services could be coordinated in the interests of both efficiency 
in the use of funds and equity between different groups of people. This 
corporatist view of planning is perhaps best portrayed in the work of Friend 
and Jessup (1969) and their colleagues at the Tavistock Institute. Various 
means have been tried to institutionalise this coordinative role for planning. 
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One of the best known in Australia is the Perth Metropolitan Regional 
Planning Authority which included representatives of the major public 
authorities as well as representatives of local government. 
Another move away from purely technical planning occurred with the rise of 
public participation (Skeffington 1969). It had long been recognised that 
there should be an opportunity for the public to comment on planning 
proposals, though often this was seen more as a means by which affected 
property owners could register complaints about possible adverse effects 
than as an opportunity for residents to have a major influence on decisions. 
The growth of environmental movements and opposition to freeways and 
demolition of housing, for example, forced a greater acceptance of the fact 
that planning is essentially a political, as well as technical, activity. Any 
planning activity benefitted some people at the expense of others and 
therefore decisions needed to be taken by an elected government. (As with 
many changes in ideas about planning, the pendulum swung too far 
towards identifying planning with political decisions, despite the fact that 
the systems view of planning - that everything that happens in a city affects 
everything else - was given a good deal of attention in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (McLoughlin 1969). 
Second, planning attempted to be comprehensive and influence, even to 
control, land use and development in great detail. This was difficult to 
achieve and, when it was achieved, the results were not to everyone's 
liking. Planning authorities tended to be bureaucratic and unimaginative in 
the way they regulated development. They were accused of stifling the 
innovative ideas that the private sector wanted to pursue (Paterson et al 
1976). Planning objectives were difficult to achieve because they required 
not only control over land use by private owners of land but also control 
over the location and timing of investment in urban infrastructure by three 
different levels of government authorities. Planning has seldom, if ever, 
been accorded a strong coordinating role in decisions about investment and 
land use by the public sector. Such a role is made more difficult because 
responsibility for urban planning is spr ead between state and local 
government, while the relevant investment and land use decisions are spread 
between three levels of government in a way which bears little relationship 
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to the distribution of planning responsibility. To make matters worse, local 
authorities frequently take a local rather than a metropolitan perspective even 
though some land use changes which they control have metropolitan 
significance. It is arguable that post-war planning would have been more 
influential if the plans had concentrated on the major elements in urban 
structure and permitted the details to be determined during implementation. 
Third, planning tended to rely on 'master plans' that concentrated on a 
desired end-state, a considerable time into the future. Once that end-state 
had been accepted through the adoption of .the plan, its achievement 
provided the rationale for land use control measures. However, it is never 
possible to be precise about the details of a desirable but distant future end-
state when circumstances are sure to change in unanticipated ways. So 
called 'master planning' tended to treat the future as known, knowable 
when certain changes could be controlled through planning. Master plans 
once adopted tended to be very inflexible. It only needed one or a few of 
the assumptions about the future on which the desired end-state was based 
to be invalidated for the whole plan to be discredited. What seemed to be 
indicated was a planning approach which focussed on changes in the right 
direction rather than an approach which was dependent on continuing 
commitment to a particular end state. 
In part, the intellectual origins of the incrementalist management approach 
which replaced comprehensive master planning are to be found in welfare 
economics, and in particular in the concept of externalities (Pearce et al 1978; 
Neutze 1978, ch.2). According to welfare economics, the need to have a 
collective input, rather than relying solely on individual decisions about land 
use, arises from the fact that decisions about use of individual plots of land 
affect other people and owners of other plots of land, perhaps because the 
proposed use of the land would generate noise or pollution or additional 
traffic. The externality problem could be dealt with by simply having a 
government body consider individual proposals for development and decide 
whether or not they would produce harmful external effects in the chosen 
location. The result would be a kind of urban management which focusses 
on control of land use in order to protect amenity. 
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Fourth, urban planning, as a manifestation of the collective will relative to 
the individual will, relies on the strength of people's willingness to sacrifice 
some part of their individual well-being in order to achieve collective goals. 
At one level, Mancur Olson (1965) has shown that the gains to individuals 
from collective action are seldom as large as the sacrifices they make. Such 
an individualistic analysis of achievement of collective goals however, 
misses the main point. The question is how highly people value the 
contribution they might make to collective benefits relative to individual 
benefits they might gain, a question of ideology and values which cannot 
be analysed by assuming that only individual benefits count. My general 
impression is that there has been a decline in collectivism and a rise in 
individualism in the west over the past three or four decades which has 
reduced the level of political support for urban planning in general, and 
especially for land use controls that are justified by the fact that they will 
help achieve some collective planning vision of the future. 
The result has been the growth of what could be defined as a minimalist 
view of planning, exemplified by the writings of Andreas Faludi (1985; 
1986). If it is not contradictory to believe that it has a view of planning, this 
could be described as a 'new right' view of planning. The core of the view 
is that we should '(l) plan as little as possible! (2) plan as late as possible! 
(3) let the decision-makers immediately concerned do their own planning as 
far as possible!' (Faludi 1985). It is not my purpose to debate the merits of 
this view but rather to argue that its rise to prominence reflects the extent to 
which there has been a retreat from the bold and visionary approach to 
planning, the achievement of which requires the future shape of a city's 
needs to be determined sufficiently in advance so that decisions with a very 
long lead time can be made within the framework of the desired future. 
The alternative, it could be argued, is a kind of prophylactic planning: 
planning which aims to prevent the negatix~ effects that would result from 
the unfettered operation of the free market. While this approach derives in 
part from an analysis of market failure, that part of welfare economics 
which points out those circumstances in which collective action is needed to 
intervene in markets to produce an efficient allocation of resources, it also 
derives much from the converse concept of non-market failure. This latter 
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concept is simply that just as markets often fail to achieve social goals, so 
also do government interventions in markets. The most popular examples 
of non-market failure are of the public interest being circumvented by the 
inefficiency and corruption of elected politicians and public officials, or an 
agency becoming the advocate (captive) of the industry or group it was set 
up to regulate. In the field of planning there have frequently been 
allegations, some substantiated, of corruption and of elected local 
governments being dominated by real estate interests able to ensure that the 
planning decisions are taken serve their private objectives rather than the 
collective objectives of the local population. 
In a situation in which the best locations for different kinds of development 
are highly dependent on one another it is inevitable that some decisions will 
lead and others follow. Master planning was based on the view that the lead 
should be taken by a planning authority with a comprehensive view of all 
parts of the system, public as well as private. The alternative is to accept 
that the lead will be taken by risk-taking large-scale private developers: they 
will make the strategic decisions. It would then remain for the lesser private 
developers and public service authorities to follow and service that 
development. The result could be a good deal less efficient than 
comprehensively planned development, especially for those services such 
as major roads, telephones and sewers which invest in lumpy and long-
lived facilities. The trend since the second world war has been away from 
attempts by planners to take the leading role and an acceptance of a more 
modest one. 
Finally, planning was also a social reform movement which promised to 
improve the lot of the poor. However, efforts to improve areas in which the 
poor lived often resulted either in new high rise flats which were 
unpopular, or, as in the case of gentrifying inner suburbs, in poor families 
being displaced by those with higher incomes who could afford to live in 
housing made increasingly valuable by the neighbourhood improvements. 
As a result, the poor were banished further from the city centre to suburbs 
where they had poorer access to the services and amenities that the central 
city provided. The suburbs on the outskirts, in which other low income 
people lived, were socially and culturally deprived and isolated from the 
social supports commonly available in the inner suburbs. In most 
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Australian cities planning did not even try to reduce the extent of social 
segregation. Canberra was an exception (Stretton 1970, ch 6). 
The discussion so far has mainly been about the inability of comprehensive 
urban planning to deliver all it seemed to promise. Planning authorities and 
departments were forced to become less ambitious. They could not control 
other parts of the bureaucracy, and could exercise only limited control over 
private development. The control over private development became even 
less politically acceptable with the rise of unemployment from the mid-
1970s. In the new environment, governments were willing to override 
planning procedures in the interests of getting any development that 
promised to provide employment, even if mostly during the construction 
phase. 
The role and influence of planning was under threat. The best that could be 
achieved was for it to operate as one of the many public authorities that have 
an interest in the way a city changes and develops. Planning authorities 
have increasingly focussed on open space, the physical environment and the 
location of residential expansion. They have found it much more difficult to 
influence redevelopment and the location of industry, commerce and 
services. The provision of open space on the other hand, has been one of 
the most successful endeavours of post-war planning. Protection of the 
physical environment, always one of the objectives of urban planning, 
gained prominence during the late 1960s and 1970s, and has been added 
explicitly to the responsibilities, and names, of planning authorities and 
departments in most states. 
The case for urban management was argued in the first instance as a means 
of broadening rather than narrowing the scope of urban planning. The fact 
that many of the important decisions about growth and change in urban 
areas were being made by parts of government other than planning 
authorities suggested that, if cities were to be managed to achieve efficiency 
and equity objectives, it would be necessary for management to include 
decisions about investment in utilities, transport services, social, education 
and health services rather than be confine~ to controlling the use of land by 
private land owners and developers. This view can be seen in a report of a 
1972 OECD Seminar (Thomley & McLoughlin 1974) and also in a 1977 
9 
Adelaide seminar organised by the Australian National Commission for 
UNESCO (1978). 
Attempts such as the establishment of the Perth Metropolitan Regional 
Planning Authority were seen by some of the proponents of urban 
management to be too strongly oriented to old-fashioned land use planning. 
In the event, service authorities decided after a time that they did not want to 
be dictated to by a planning authority, even if they were members of it. In 
the Australian context where state governments have the main responsibility 
for urban development, it was argued that state cabinets were, or should be, 
the real planning authorities. The extent to which they did could be 
assessed only by a detailed examination of the way they operated, but 
certainly several states established either cabinet subcommittees or 
committees of senior officials to coordinate the local impacts of government 
programs (Neutze 1978, Ch. 10). 
In making the case for a more broadly conceived urban management, it was 
necessary to point out the shortcomings of end-state planning described 
above. In a context in which the political support for planning was 
declining, it was easy for its critics to seize on urban management as an 
alternative to forward-oriented urban planning rather than, as it was 
originally conceived, as a way of making it more effective. Rather than an 
opportunity to make planning more effective, it often became a way of 
retreating into ad hoc and short term policy decisions. Rather than 
harnessing the management of urban services to achieve long term planning 
goals, planning controls could be harnessed to serve the interests of the 
government as provider of services and, increasingly, as the promoter of 
any private or public developments that promised to increase employment. 
The Limits to Urban Management 
The shift from comprehensive master planning to urban management, while 
an understandable response to performance shortcomings of the former, 
does not permit the achievement of some of the recognised objectives of 
urban planning. Indeed, there is a real danger of throwing out the baby with 
the bathwater. Urban management, as I understand it, aims to ensure that 
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each individual decision taken in either the public or the private sector is 
consistent with some general environmental and planning objectives. Those 
objectives need not be defined in a physical plan with any precision but may 
well be incorporated in something more like performance standards. Urban 
management is perfectly capable of protecting the environment and amenity 
from the adverse effects of individual decisions. It is less capable of 
considering the cumulative effect of many related decisions taken over a 
number of years. For example, each individual development in an 
unsewered area may have a negligible impact on the level of pollution of 
surface or groundwater but a number of decisions to permit such 
developments may produce unacceptable results. The result can be a 
'tyranny of small decisions'. The only way to avoid the problem is to 
consider options for a large number and a wide range of related land use 
changes that are likely to occur over a number of years and assess the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative sets of changes. Once a 
decision on the best alternative has been taken, it can be implemented only 
by a commitment over a number of years. This, of course, is just what 
comprehensive master planning attempts to do. 
Comprehensive master planning and more pragmatic urban management 
have been presented as though they were alternatives between which it is 
necessary to make a choice. A more useful understanding of the 
relationship between the two approaches is to see them as at the extreme 
ends of a continuum. At one extreme, urban management achieves 
flexibility, the ability to adjust to changing circumstances and to permit the 
greatest advantage to be taken of the imagination and inventiveness of the 
private sector as it initiates urban development in its pursuit of profits. At 
the other extreme, comprehensive master planning allows opportunities to 
be considered for alternative broad patterns of urban development which 
cannot be considered by a competitive market. By facilitating coordination, 
it can permit the more efficient use of public infrastructure and of large scale 
private investment. It can achieve also a better spatial relationship between 
the areas where people work, live, shop and recreate, and a better balance 
between development and conservation:it is possible to choose a point in 
the continuum by trading off flexibility against coordination and 
commitment. 
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Rather than perceiving urban management with a short time horizon as an 
approach to planning, it is better to see it as an alternative to planning. The 
term planning involves the setting of some kind of goal or vision of the 
future and the directing of action to achieve that goal. Planning sets such 
goals in the form of a physical plan and involves a series of measures to 
achieve the goals. Urban management does not require the setting of goals 
in any well-defined sense. It does involve the application of general criteria, 
mostly of the environmental and amenity type, to proposed urban 
developments. The difference is between goal-directed land use planning 
and pragmatic land use control. Urban management can be used to 
implement plans, or can be used simply to achieve or protect the quality of 
the environment and amenity. 
Within the area of analysis encompassed by welfare economics there is 
occasional mention of another reason for collective regulation of land use 
decisions which is similar to externalities in that it reflects the fact that 
location/land use decisions are frequently interdependent. It refers to the 
advantages that accrue from coordination of related decisions which are 
commonly taken by different individuals and organisations, often at 
different times (Neutze 1978, ch.2). Coordination can bring gains because 
the best location for one person or firm often depends on (unknowable) 
future location decisions of others. Unlike externalities, coordination has 
not been examined to any significant extent in welfare economics because it 
requires analysis that is sensitive to the impacts over time of relative location 
of related activities. Economics has made very little progress in examining 
the implications of such interdependence. Externalities are among the few 
examples of interdependence which it considers. 
A recent report to the Nuffield Foundation (1986) attempted to grapple with 
what it saw as the excessive rigidity of blueprint' planning in Britain under 
which plans take a long time to be approved and are revised infrequently. It 
proposed that planning should be seen as a continuous or at least an iterative 
process. Plans should be revised frequently in the light of changing 
circumstances and to ensure that they remain consistent with the financial 
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resources available for their implementation. The closest the report came to 
recognising the trade-offs described above was virtually to deny them: 
Plannin$_ as a process is not a weak option: while it avoids the 
inflexibility and increasing irrelevance of the 'blueprint', it 
requires from politicians and their advisors a commitment to 
decide in advance on what is a desirable future and how to qet 
there, to make decisions in accordance with this original vision 
and to make sure that individual policies and projects are 
compatible with it. It is in strict contrast to the policy of 
incrementalism or drift where decisions are made ad hoc to meet 
each problem or crisis as it arises, with no view as to the 
desirable direction of change or at least with no framework within 
which to judge decisions as they are made. But process planning 
should provide flexibility to ensure that the planning system, and 
the decisions made within it, respond to changinq social and 
economic circumstances, changing views and priorities, and 
improvements in our understanding of complex physical, social 
and economic forces. [Nuffield Foundation 1986, p.150] 
While the strong reaction against 'blueprint' planning is understandable, it 
does not justify the assertion that nothing is lost in the process. The gains 
from flexibility may well be worth the costs, but the costs are significant. 
The planners of sewerage systems and. main roads will not be confident 
about their own investments if they are based on .plans which are expected 
to be revised every three years. 'Desirable futures' are easier to achieve 
when it is known that governments are committed to them. 
What seems to be required is a greater degree of sophistication in urban 
planning in which different aspects of the plan carry differing degrees of 
commitment into the future. Perhaps this is what the report meant in the 
paragraph following the above quotation iri which it seems to me that 
flexibility is qualified: 
Planning should be flexible. The policies and programmes it 
produces should be capable of change, if found wanting. Each 
decision should be taken with awareness of the options it will 
foreclose for the future as well as the problems it will solve now. 
Land use and development require a long view, and public sector 
decisions now are too often made without any framework of 
policy or plan at all, or efse with a framework which is hopelessly 
out of date [Nuffield Foundation 1986, pp.150-1] 
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Conclusions 
Urban management was originally conceived of as a way of increasing the 
effectiveness with which governments could guide urban development in 
the interests of efficiency in both the public and the private sector and of 
equity. Since the concept was originally introduced, however, there has 
been a decline in political support for radical regulation · of urban 
development. The criticisms that were levelled at the performance of urban 
planning have been used as a justification for retreating from some of its 
more ambitious attempts to determine urban futures. Some recent writings 
on the topic imply that a retreat from 'blueprint' planning would bring 
unambiguous gains. It is the contention of this paper that the gains in 
flexibility which come with the kind of urban management which is less 
oriented to a long term vision of the future will necessarily be accompanied 
by losses in efficiency through less effective coordination between different 
investment decisions, and an inability to consider large scale alternatives in 
patterns of development. 
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THE INSTRUJ\1ENTS OF PLANNING: 
Urban Management 
John Mant 
Partner, Phillips Fox, Solicitors 
Introduction 
Urban management is not an instrument of planning. Plan-making is an 
instrument of urban management. 
Plans are needed from time to time for particular purposes. It is a mistake 
to conceive of 'planning' as a simple lineal progression from plan to 
implementation. Further, 'planning' and 'urban management' should not be 
conceived as competing approaches to urban public policy. The making of 
plans should be seen as a public policy tool for the achievement of 
deliberate, and at times, quite limited objectives. Urban managers are not 
the implementers of plans prepared by professional planners. Rather, 
professional plan-makers are but some of the urban managers whose civic 
and infrastructure design skills and strategic understanding are employed at 
times and on tasks considered necessary in the process of managing an 
urban area. 
Planning does not equal the production of the plan. Planning is thinking 
ahead before making a decision. Thinking ahead and deciding to leave 
aspects of the development of a city to market forces can be as valid a 
decision as deciding to produce a plan and control development according to 
its precepts. 
Professional planners, especially as employees of an independent or semi-
independent state planning agency, are not given the function of 
coordinating everyone else in a government for good reasons. The agency 
is not structured to be a central agency. Further, the other professionally-
based organisations in government do not recognise the planning profession 
as pre-eminent. 
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Accordingly, professionally-based planning agencies are given powers 
limited to development control and some allied functions such as land 
acquisition for particular purposes. Generally, even the power to control 
the development of other government agencies is circumscribed. 
Public Policy Tasks in Managing Urban Areas 
I have gone through some 50 pieces of research on policy 
questions in the last few years and every instance is marked l7y an 
absence of any attempt to define the term ... 
For the most part, "policy" and "planning" are used in their 
ordinary language sense and are, therefore, virtually 
indistin~uishable from a strategy, programme, design 
description, schematic, and guide - and they are often made 
sy_nonymous with decision, goal, and outcome. [Landau 1973, p. 
537] 
Dye eschews complex definitions of public policy and suggests that public 
policy is "whatever governments choose to do or not to do" (Dye 1981, 
p.l). 
Urban policy is but a part of public policy generally. The pretension of 
urban planning is that, by its 'holistic approach', it is in some special 
category of public policy activity. As mentioned above, the situation in 
terms of legal powers is somewhat different. The breadth of the policy 
interest and the narrowness of the power given to planning agencies has led 
to ambivalence about the effectiveness of urban planning as it is practised 
(Kilmartin & Thoms 1978: p. 101). 
The public policy tasks in managing urban areas include the following four 
areas: 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Setting 
Economic policy tools influence substantially the structure and nature of 
cities.One has only to compare the post-war economy in Australia and its 
dependence on the 'suburbanisation industry', with the policies regarding 
capital investment adopted by Japan, to appreciate the urban consequences 
of the use of these policy tools. A recent example is the treatment of 
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pensioner-owned homes so far as the assets test is concerned, and the 
abse.nce of capital gains tax on the family home. If these policies were 
changed, it could be expected that there would be a substantial increase in 
the demand for small or medium-density housing from the per cent of 
pensioners who own their own homes. 
Other examples of economic policy tools come from the manner in which 
funds are made available by the Commonwealth to the State; for example, 
the extent and nature of public housing and the amount of loan funds 
available for infrastructure development. 
Administrative Structures 
The structure of public sector organisations affect the nature and sequence 
of decisions relating to the development of urban areas. Public sector 
organisations have needs which are reflected in urban development 
decisions. 
A public sector organisation designed to produce low-density allotments for 
sale will tend to pursue public policy objectives which encourage the 
production of detached house lots as a means of fulfilling accommodation 
demands. Other alternatives will tend to be discounted by that organisation. 
Such a policy bias may be overcome by the existence of other public or 
private sector organisations with other policy objectives, but where they do 
not exist, or are subsumed within a single organisation, such strong 
organisational needs can become powerful determinants ofurbart policy. 
It becomes clear that managers are partisan players in the political 
processes which arise and give shape to the structuring of 
relations. Their position and standing in these processes 
depends on their reputed and demonstrated ability to shape and 
maintain systems of order to which sufficient and significant 
groupings within the organisation and wider society can 
subscribe. 
The activities in which they engage, (i.e. propagating generalised 
value-rule frameworks) are not mutual in content and in intent. 
Rather, these activities are oriented towards shapings and/or 
sustaining the external systems or order and sustaining their own 
positions both within and external to an organisation. [Degeling 
& Colebatch 1984, p. 327] 
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Individuals within organisations tend to behave as the organisation, through 
its formal and informal structures, requires them to behave. An important 
policy tool for the management of urban areas is therefore to be found in the 
restructuring of influential agencies to provide different organisational 
needs. 
Investment Decisions 
Obviously decisions regarding the initial investment in infrastructure, as 
well as policies relating to the operation and maintenance of services, 
influence both city functions and forms. The public policy influences 
operating on investment decisions represent a complex set of relationships 
flowing from fiscal and monetary policies, organisational needs, the 
technology of budgetary systems, and community demands. 
Exercise of Development Control 
Governments exercise development control to prohibit certain uses in 
specified. areas. In addition, conditions relating to matters of design or 
financial contribution to public services may be imposed. The zoning of an 
area of land for particular uses will not ensure that those uses take place. 
Development control is essentially a negative and reactive policy tool which 
depends upon a demand for investment or change of use to occur before the 
policy tool takes effect. This demand for investment or change will occur as 
a result of general economic policies and/or by public investment decisions 
relating to urban infrastructure such as transport or hydraulic services. 
When practitioners speak about 'positive planning' rather than 'negative 
planning' (i.e. development control), they tend to be speaking of 
influencing the general economic policies and public investment decisions 
which may give rise to investment. Sometimes, of course, 'positive 
planning' is seen as the waiving of a development control to provide a land 
owner with a capital gain and thus tum an unprofitable development 
(unprofitable because the price paid for the land reflected its zoning at the 
time of purchase) into one that will return a surplus. 
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The Role of Plans 
Cadastral Maps 
Development control requires a plan; that is, it depends on a cadastral map 
showing areas of land (zones) where different rules apply regarding the 
nature of development which will be permitted. These rules identify land 
uses which will be encouraged or prohbibited and may describe the design 
and siting and functional requirements for particular types of development. 
As development control requires legislation to make it effective, the rules 
applying to various zones will need to be enforceable. Accordingly, the 
plan showing the zones will be given statutory recognition in some manner. 
Investment decisions by government also involve a plan of some kind to 
provide the information on which to base decisions regarding the location of 
services and facilities. This plan will serve two purposes: first, to identify 
the areas where development is or is not likely to take place, and secondly, 
to identify cadastrally where the service or facility should be located. These 
plans do not require statutory force and there is no legal requirement that 
they be made available to the public. 
Strategic Plans 
The publication of a plan to advise the public regarding broad policies for 
the future of urban areas (as against advising land owners of the 
conequences of those policies for their development rights) does not require 
the publication of a cadastral map. It is for this reason that the strategic 
plans which have been published in recent years for metropolitan areas have 
tended not to be on a cadastral base. The first generation of metropolitan 
plans, on the other hand, were on a cadastral base. The legislation 
establishing the planning control system required a statutory metropolitan 
plan as the basis of the imposition of that control. 
A major difficulty with the first generation plans was this confusion of aims 
- strategic and statutory. The consequence was that, in a number of areas, 
statutory land use decisions were made far in advance of the need to make 
them. In the interests of being able to present an overall long-term end-state 
plan, later policy options were foreclosed by statutory zonings which, for 
legal, financial or political reasons, could not be later down-zoned. 
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Subsequent strategic plans have not had to double as statutory plans. If 
new policy required an alteration to zoning controls, amendments to the 
existing cadastral zoning plans could be made either on a wholesale or 
individual basis. In these circumstances, the cadastral plans can be seen as 
tools of the strategic policy doc1:!.111ent. 
Given that the latter day strategic plans are not required for operation of a 
development control system (although they may be needed to politically 
justify changes to the controls), the issue to be considered is the 
effectiveness of a public strategic planning exercise as a tool of public 
policy-making for an urban region. 
Urban Plan-making as an Example of Rational Comprehensive 
Policy 
The above discussion attempts to place the role of plan-making in the urban 
policy context. What follows is an analysis of the traditional form of urban 
plan-making as a public policy technique. It is argues that urban plan-
making of the traditional kind is an example of the 'rational comprehensive' 
approach to public policy-making. 
The Rational Comprehensive Model 
Policies are based on some understanding of cause and effect. Policies 
involve both goals and the means of attaining them. Goal setting raises a 
question of values which need to be resolved by 'the community'. 
The rational comprehensive model of policy-making involves a series of 
logical steps (Kellow 1987). These can be summarised as: 
I. Identify general goals. 
2. Translate goals into objectives which are more specific and can 
guide action. 
3. Rank the objectives in order of priority. 
4. Examine alternative courses of action for achieving each given 
objective, making explicit costs and benefits attached to each. 
5. Examine the feasibility of various options, noting the extent to 
which they add or detract from other values. 
22 
6. Choose one option by comparing the expected benefits of each 
with its probable costs. 
7. Implement the chosen course of action. 
8. Monitor and evaluate. 
This model of policy-making has been criticised by several writers (Simon 
1976; Lindblom 1959, 1979). Simon has argued that human beings rarely 
adopt this decision-making approach; people simply do not have the wits to 
maximise. Part of the problem is that determining all the potentially 
favourable and unfavourable consequences of all the feasible courses of 
actions would require the decision-maker to process so much information 
that impossible demands would be made on resources and mental capacity. 
Decision-makers are often under severe pressure of time which preculdes 
careful search and appraisal. Such information as is available may be 
coloured. Decision-makers, in fact, use a bounded rationality'. 
The criticisms of the rational comprehensive model can be summarised as 
relating to three factors : 
resources are inevitably limited 
information reaching the decision maker is often coloured 
time lags often cause information to be out of date by the time it 
arrives. 
lncrementalism Contrasted 
The competing model of decision-making, called incrementalism by its first 
theorist, is also known as the model of successive limited comparison. For 
Lindblom 'muddling through' is a process to be commended, not 
condemned. Richardson and Jordon (1979) compare the rational 
comprehensive model to the incrementalist model (or as they describe it, the 
successive limited comparison model). 
The fundamental underpinning of successive limited comparison (or 
incrementalism) is that policy-making involves achieving agreement 
between groups. This is a primary reason for avoiding a preliminary 
insistence on clarification of values or.,objectives - the probability of 
harmony at that stage is low. The emphasis on accommodation between 
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groups explains why decision-making takes the form of comparison 
between the pragmatically available alternatives. 
Rational Comprehensive Model 
Clarification of values or 
objectives distinct from and 
usually prerequisite to impartial 
analysis of alternative policies. 
Policy formulation is therefore 
approached through a means-end 
analysis; first, ends are isolated, 
then means to achieve them are 
sought. 
• The test of a good policy is that it 
can be shown to be the more 
appropriate means to desired ends. 
Analysis is comprehensive; every 
relevant factor is taken into account. 
Theory is often heavily relied 
upon. 
Successive Limited Comparison 
Model 
• Selection of value goals and 
empirical analysis of the 
needed action are not distinct 
from one another but are 
closely entwined. 
• Since means and ends are not 
distinct; means-end analysis is 
often inappropriate or limited. 
• The test of a good policy is 
typically that various analysts 
find themselves agreeing on a 
policy (without their agreeing 
that it is the most appropriate 
means to an agreed objective). 
• Analysis is dramatically imited; 
(a) important possible out-
comes are neglected; 
(b) important potential 
policies are neglected; 
(c) unportant affected values 
are neglected. 
• A succession of comparisons 
greatly reduces or eliminates 
reliance on theory. 
There is also an economy of effort by limiting variables so that the 
consideration of options is an intellectually manageable operation. In this 
sense there is a reference to Simon's 'bounded rationality'. There is 
economy of effort in looking at the margins, where one reasonably expects 
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the end-choice will emerge. This is possible because current negotiations 
move from a position already agreed to by the policy analysts. 
With an incremental approach, one only ever expects to achieve goals 
partially. The whole process is therefore repeated endlessly. Each policy 
adjustment is regarded as merely an incremental improvement on the past, 
not the ultimate or best policy. To stop the process at some point and 
cement policy to that time is to restrict the development of policy. 
Incrementalism is a technique for simplifying a complex world and avoiding 
intractable value conflicts. Its strength is that it explicitly incorporates 
politics into decision-making, whereas the rational comprehensive model 
tends to neglect politics. In this sense, incrementalism reflects more 
accurately the way in which most decision-making. 
The issue is whether a model which describes what exists, is also a model 
which provides decision-makers with what ought to be. Indeed, is 
incrementalism a procedure which is being advanced, or is it just a realistic 
analysis of what happens in government policy-making? 
This raises the distinction between 'policy analysis', which relates 
principally to an understanding of methods for evaluating alternative 'policy 
proposals', and 'policy theory', which attempts to explain why certain 
alternatives are chosen and others are not. Policy analysis taking place in 
ignorance of questions of power and influence (as tends to be the case with 
the rational comprehensive approach) is not likely to provide advice that is 
very useful to politicians. 
/ncrementa/ism: A Critique 
Incrementalism has been criticised as a defence of the status quo and for 
providing the means whereby powerful groups within society can protect 
their interests. Lindblom defended objections to incrementalism (1979) by 
arguing that incrementalism need not be slow-moving and conservative; a 
rapid sequence of small changes may result in~ more drastic alteration of 
the status quo than one major change. This is especially so as incremental 
steps "do not stir up the great antagonism and paralyzing schism~ as do 
proposals for more drastic change" (1979, p. 52). 
25 
It has also been suggested that an incremental approach constrains decision-
makers where the results of past policies are undesirable and risks need to 
be taken in a comprehensive and radically new departure. Proceeding by 
incremental steps therefore may be an appropriate response for some 
problems but a totally inadequate one for others. On the other hand, the 
rational-comprehensive model does seem to require the impossible. What 
is needed is to discover how rational and how comprehensive the policy 
analysis should be in any particular case. What is needed is a policy about 
policy-making and an ability to select a process which fits the problem to be 
solved. 
In urban policy-making, what is needed is a policy about the role of plans in 
the solution to the particular issues of the time. 
Plan-making 
Strategic plan-making can be seen as a form of policy-making which fits the 
rational comprehensive model of decision-making. Values and objectives 
play an important role, analysis is intentionally comprehensive ('holistic') 
and it is ideally carried out by experts operating at arms length from and in 
advance · of the activities of the politicians and urban managers (or 
implementers). 
It is argued below that the traditional urban plan-making exercise suffers 
from the same difficulties as any other rational comprehensive approach to 
, decision-making. 
Value Clarification 
Clarification of values and objectives at metropolitan scale is impossible 
other than at the most general level. Recourse must be made to such 
misleading and artificial constructs as 'the community' to avoid the 
difficulty, or even the impossibility, of resolving the conflicts of values and 
objectives between the individuals, groups and organisations which, in fact, 
constitute society. These generalising constraints enable the plan-making 
activity to be presented as non-political or 'professional'. 
Means and Ends 
Means and ends also are difficult to disentangle. This is especially so given 
the means/ends confusions inherent in the structures of public sector 
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organisations. In State and local governments, for the most part, public 
sector organisations have been structured so that they have a majority of 
senior positions on the production side and not the demand side. Decision-
making techniques supporting solutions which result continue to provide the 
productive means of an agency will tend to be favoured over procedures 
which concentrate on identifying demands which may be satisfied by a 
variety of means, including those beyond the scope of the agency (Mant 
1981). In these circumstances, the particular means supplied by the agency 
will be assumed to be the most appropriate ones for producing an end 
which, far from being isolated at the outset of the process, will be generated 
to justify the continuation of that production. 
Overlnad 
Even if the competing values could be identified adequately and ends could 
be agreed to before consideration of means was commenced, 
comprehensive analysis of every relevant factor is beyond the capacity of 
even computer-assisted systems. A number of factors have to be ignored 
and in this process some theory is introduced to assist. However, theory in 
metropolitan planning exercises tends to be applied not to deal with the 
comprehensive analysis of every relevant factor, but to dispose of a number 
of factors and make more manageable the manipulation of data. In reality,; 
comprehensive rationality is bounded by the capacity of decision-makers to 
manipulate the variables. The selection of theories or standards to limit the 
extent of the rationality tends to be a priori justified with recourse to the 
professional standing of 'the Planners'. 
Coloured Information 
In addition to the limited resources available to carry out a rational 
comprehensive metropolitan planning exercise, information reaching the 
planner is often coloured. Reference has been made above to the 
consequences for the means/ends debate of the organisational structure of 
many public service agencies. The political agenda of these organisations 
and their Ministers and supporters (Degeling & Colebatch 1984) may not 
permit the distribution of information which seriously calls into question 
the continued existence of programmes of the agency. 
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The open nature of most planning exercises inevitably colours the 
information which is given firstly to the planners and secondly to the public 
by the planners. Serious critici~m of past or present policies of an existing 
government or of its agencies, or predictions of downturns in the economy 
of a region, or the performance of any sector involved in urban 
development, or in the financial capacity of government to deliver services, 
will tend to be suppressed. Indeed, even the proffering of such views 
within the internal workings of government by the planning agency may be 
seen as evidence of pessimism and lack of support by that agency for the 
programmes of government. (Agency heads do not readily volunteer to be 
the messenger who tells the emperor he is naked). 
An information gap will also occur between the wide scope of the planners' 
policy interests and the limited scope of their instrumental power. The 
inability of the agency to guarantee the necessary coordination which 
implementation of the plan requires will tend not to be highlighted in the 
information on which the public planning exercise is based. To do so, 
would be an admission of the comparative weakness of the plan-making 
agency and/or lack of government commitment to the planning process as a 
whole. This, when combined with the inhibitions created by the political 
process described in the previous paragraph, can create an unreal 
expectation of the results which will flow from the pla_n on the part of both 
public and private organisation. 
, 
Timing 
Fatal to the effectiveness of the traditional rational comprehensive urban 
planning process is the fact that the output is inevitably out of date. If the 
process is lineal, requiring first the plan and then its implementation, 
inevitably that which is being implemented will be based on information 
which is less timely than the information available to the implementers. The 
publication of the stategic plan stops the policy process and cements policy 
to that time. 
The traditional approach to such a strategic, end-state planning exercise 
starts with a prediction of future populations and households. Given that 
these predictions will be dependent on several exogenous factors, especially 
inward and outward migration, higher and lower predictions will be 
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generated depending on how those factors are treated. Given also that the 
exercise is intent on producing a single end-state plan to be implemented to 
achieve a particular physical result at a nominated date, one prediction will 
have to be chosen as the basis on which the plan will be produced. The 
distribution of new households between existing urban areas and the 
proposed new urban areas also will require a prediction about future market 
behaviour. Again, the nature of the output will require the selection of a 
single prediction. 
The combination of these two forecasts will provide the predicted demands 
for new urban land or higher density or different use zones in the existing 
urban areas . Having regard to the stock available, the new plan can be 
produced showing the various areas of land uses which will need to be 
available to meet the predicted demands. Once the plan has been accepted, it 
can be implemented by the exercise of development control by the planning 
agency and by the construction of head works and distribution services and 
other community services by the utility and community service agencies. 
The problem is that when the agencies come to implement the plan, their 
information concerning the outcomes of the predictions will be actual rather 
than predictive. The twin problems of the timeliness of the data and the 
nature of the output determining the need for the selection of a single 
prediction leads to the locking of agencies into a plan based on information 
which was less current than that available to the agency when it committed 
the project. An end-state plan is not an appropriate mechanism for 
determining timing or even extent. 
Summary 
It has been argued above that the rational comprehension approach to 
development of public policy is equivalent to traditional plan-making. As 
such, plan-making of this nature suffers from those difficulties which have 
been identified by several writers as affecting the usefulness of the 
comprehensive approach to policy-making. 
It has been suggested that the public policy task in managing urban areas, 
far from being a simple lineal progression from plan-making to 
implementation, is a complex interaction of policy-making and 
implementation which approximates the more realistic descriptions of the 
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policy processes provided by the incrementalists. In this web of 
interactions, plan-making has certain roles or tasks, particularly with regard 
to the exercise of development control and the location of infrastructure and 
other public services. The making of a plan for a particular purpose should 
not be seen as an end to the policy process; rather it is merely a point at 
which one of the many product.§ of that process is produced. 
Development Programming 
Both the Melbourne and Perth strategy plans see a 'development 
programme' as being a system for the implementation of the strategy. It is 
suggested that this is a limited view of the use of this public policy 
technique. The better view is to see it as an example of strategic 
incrementalism and superior to the rational comprehensive approach adopted 
by planning agencies when preparing a strategic ~nd-state plan. 
The first development programme system evolved in South Australia during 
the late 1970s where it was called 'The Staging Study'. (In the early 1980s, 
the process was adopted with more limited objectives in NSW as the 
'Urban Development Program'). The Staging Study was deliberately 
established as a substitute for the end-state planning process which was then 
in train within the State Planning Authority. Although its title denoted 
limited objectives for the exercise, its policy scope was intended to be wide. 
The process was iterative and concentrated on influencing key groups and 
organisations. It sought agreement on selected but crucial issues. It was 
strategic in that there were clear, but limited, policy aims. 
So far as the planning agency was concerned, there were two important 
policy issues; first, the quite unreal expectations of the government and the 
leading development agencies of the likely demand for housing in the 
Adelaide metropolitan area, and secondly, the demand by major 
infrastructure agencies that long-term land use decisions be taken in order to 
allow them to make decisions about the location and timing of their 
investments. A process was needed whereby the assumptions on which 
demand expectations were based could be closely questioned and in which 
the demands for long-term decisions could be assessed. 
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The Staging Study required vastly improved and continuous demographic 
monitoring, a detailed appreciation of subdivided and raw land stocks and 
land owners' development intentions, and information about the forward 
programmes of public agencies. The output of the work in part, was a five 
to ten-year annual rolling programme identifying releases and coordinating 
services. As originally conceived, the staging study was not merely a 
value-free coordinating process to facilitate fringe development according to 
an end-statge strategy plan. Underlying the work at the time were clear 
strategic objectives, summed up as the constraint of unnecessary fringe 
expansion of the metropolitan area, and the reduction of the use of housing 
assistance programmes (both public rental and purchasing assistance) to 
encourage lower income families to live in new fringe suburbs, A major 
objective of the work at the time was to encourage more affluent households 
into fringe estates with low-income families moving into middle and inner-
ring suburbs. 
The Staging Study therefore had two predictions - one expansive, the other 
constrained. The achievement of the constrained strategy required a wide 
range of policy changes to occur. These include a re-writing of the 
Commonwealth/State Housing Agreement to change the accounting 
requirements placed on housing and lending authorities and to encourage 
policy and programme changes in agencies such as the Housing Trust, the 
South Australian Land Commission, and the Engineering and Water Supply 
Department. It also required 'pro-active' management by the planning 
agency staff to unlock legal and political constraints in the way of 
developing land within the existing metropolitan area. 
The output of the Staging Study, therefore, was a wide and complex range 
of policy actions which were intent on changing the nature of demands 
made by public agencies and the market rather than merely facilitating the 
satisfaction of those demands by co-ordinating the development of new 
estates. As originally conceived, the Staging Study was not a tool for 
implementing the regional scheme but a mechanism for changing the 
government public policies which had given rise to the demands in the first 
place. 
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The problem in the late 1970s was that the political climate was not 
conducive to admissions that the continued expansion of Adelaide by low-
income subsidised housing was not in the best interests of either the future 
of the city or the members of those households. (However much it might be 
seen to be in the interests of the building industry and sections of the single 
purpose housing and infrastructure agencies). A new end-state strategic 
planning study at that time certainly was not the appropriate policy tool to 
adopt as its conclusions would only have supported the political dialogue of 
the time. 
; 
There are times when a public discussion of development directions are 
appropriate. As predicted in the 1970s, that time came in Adelaide in the 
mid-1980s. It was recognised that it would then be necessary to identify 
which of the several areas suitable for future development should be 
rezoned. 
Adelaide 
The Adelaide Long Term Development Strategy (SADEP 1987) is just such 
a document. The work has taken place within the context of the 
government's management of Adelaide. Unfortunately, instead oflimiting 
itself to an assessment of which areas should be selected for development, it 
mounted a campaign to justify changes to residential zonings in support of a 
policy of 'urban consolidation'. As with every other such frontal attack, 
this may merely have hardened rather than softened opposition. As a policy 
tool for assessing future development areas, the Adelaide plan is 
appropriate. It may have been the wrong policy tool for selling urban 
consolidation policies. 
Perth 
The policy purposes served by the production of the extensive review of the 
Corridor Plan and Metropolitan Region Planning Study appeared to be quite 
limited. While Planning for the Future of the Perth Metropolitan Region 
(W ASPC 1987) has some sensible things to say about establishing a 
Metropolitan Development Programme, there is not a great deal of content 
in the rest of the document. It does: 
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identify new areas for urban development outside those identified 
in the Corridor Plan (one hopes that strategies for ensuring such · 
land will be developed at reasonable prices and at least cost to the 
public sector were in place before the areas were identified); and 
acknowledge formally that idealistic expectations regarding 
regional centres in the Corridor Plan were not likely to be achieved. 
Both these results could have been achieved with far less cost and effort. 
As with other public efforts in large-scale strategic plans, crucial and 
politically embarrassing issues are skirted over or avoided. For example, of 
major importance to the planning of metropolitan Perth, is, on the one hand, 
the comparative impotence of the State government to influence directly the 
development controls which exist in local plans and, on the other, the wide 
discretion those controls give councils to consent to commercial and retail 
uses in a wide range of locations. The hopes and aspirations expressed by 
the review for central and regional centres fail to face up to the State's 
impotence. This statement is typical of the failure: 
.. . new employment growth, particularly in the office and service 
sector - which has increasingly located in inner suburban areas, 
along major arterial roads and in other scattered locations 
throughout the region - should be directed more towards Major 
Regional and other commercial centres. [WASPC 1987: p 105] 
There is no discussion on just how such activities are to be 'directed'. 
Melbourne 
The Melbourne document is more operationally focussed. It contains a 
wide range of policy initiatives, many of ':"hich could occur given the 
State's complete power over development control policies and decisions, 
the increasingly corporate nature of its Cabinet and central agency activities 
and the considerable contraction in the number of public agencies involved 
in urban management. (For example, since 1983 one planning agency has 
been created out of five sepa'}te organisations, one public land agency out 
of seven units and five transport agencies with a strong central direction out 
of eight. The government land department has been strengthened and new 
waterways responsibilities have been given to the Board of Works). The 
Melbourne document is evidence of a corporate planning exercise by 
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government. It is a statement of where things are at, rather than an end-state 
plan and is to be welcomed as evidence of efforts to focus on ongoing 
operational requirements. By contrast with the Perth document, work 
seems to have been done to identify the initial policy purpose of the 
exercise. The nature of the output was not assumed before the issues to be 
addressed were considered. 
In common with the Perth doc ument, the Melbourne policy proposes a 
development programme (a metropolitan seivices coordination system) and, 
like the Perth document, one suspects that the real consequences of such a 
process in terms of the nature and place of thal activity within the planning 
agency and the skills of the officers required have not been fully 
appreciated. In neither case has the proposed development programme 
process been seen as a fundamental change in the public policy processes 
from the rational comprehensive approach of the strategy plan to the 
strategic incrementalism of the development programme. In both cases 
urban management is seen as the implementation of planners' plans, rather 
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